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Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity

Wilson, Alastair (2010) Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity. Philosophical Studies, 149 (3). pp. 321-326. ISSN 0031-8116

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URL of Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1

Identification Number/DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1

How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate. Both problems derive from a failure of commutativity between application of the equal weight view and updating in the light of other evidence.

Type of Work:Article
Date:2010 (Publication)
School/Faculty:Colleges (2008 onwards) > College of Arts & Law
Department:Philosophy
Subjects:B Philosophy (General)
Institution:University of Birmingham
Copyright Holders:Springer Verlag
ID Code:1125
Refereed:YES
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