Wilson, Alastair (2010) Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity. Philosophical Studies, 149 (3). pp. 321-326. ISSN 0031-8116
| URL of Published Version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1 Identification Number/DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1 How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate. Both problems derive from a failure of commutativity between application of the equal weight view and updating in the light of other evidence. |
| Type of Work: | Article |
|---|---|
| Date: | 2010 (Publication) |
| School/Faculty: | Colleges (2008 onwards) > College of Arts & Law |
| Department: | Philosophy |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy (General) |
| Institution: | University of Birmingham |
| Copyright Holders: | Springer Verlag |
| ID Code: | 1125 |
| Refereed: | YES |
| Local Holdings: |
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