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"True" as Ambiguous

Kolbel, Max (2007) "True" as Ambiguous. Philosophy and phenomenological research. ISSN 1933-1592 (Submitted)

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URL of Published Version: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00195.x/abstract

Identification Number/DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00195.x

In this paper, I argue (a) that the predicate “true” is ambiguously used to express a deflationary and a substantial concept of truth and (b) that the two concepts are systematically related in that substantial truths are deflationary truths of a certain kind. Claim (a) allows one to accept the main insights of deflationism but still take seriously, and participate in, the traditional debate about the nature of truth. Claim (b) is a contribution to that debate. The overall position is not new and it has previously been defended by supervaluationists about vagueness. However, the position is here motivated in a new, independent way, and an explanation is offered why some uses of “true” do not seem to require disambiguation.

Type of Work:Article
Date:September 2007 (Publication)
School/Faculty:Schools (1998 to 2008) > School of Social Science
Department:Department of Philosophy
Subjects:B Philosophy (General)
P Philology. Linguistics
BD Speculative Philosophy
Institution:University of Birmingham
Copyright Holders:unspecified
ID Code:20
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